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JURISDICTION
Defendant has no objection to the Plaintiff's statement of jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Defendant disagrees with the Plaintiff's Statement of the Issues
Presented for Review # 1 . Plaintiff's issue #1 was not a basis of the Court's
decisions on the Order on Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute
Decedent's Heirs as a Party (R. at 129-32) and the Order on URCP Rule 25
Motion to Dismiss (R. at 150-52). The following is a more appropriate
statement of the issue presented for review:
I.

Whether the District Court exceeded its permitted range of

discretion by striking the Plaintiff's Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP")
Rule 25 motion to substitute because the motion sought to substitute the
wrong party and did not contain the required notice of hearing.
Standard of Review: Whether the Court exceeded its permitted range
of discretion in granting a motion to strike is reviewed on an abuse of
discretion standard. Rivera ex rel. Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co..
2000 UT 36, 117, 1 P.3d 539.
The Defendant does not object to the Plaintiff's Statement of Issue
Presented for Review #2 and the Standard of Review.
l

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The Defendant agrees the interpretation of URCP Rule 25, Utah Code
Ann. §75-3-104 (1975) and Utah Code Ann. §78-ll-12(l)(a)(1991) are
determinative of this appeal. In addition, the Defendant asserts that URCP
41 and its interpretation is determinative of this appeal. However, the
Defendant disagrees that Utah Code Ann. §75-2-103 (1998) and Utah Code
Ann. §75-2-106 (1998) are determinative of any issue in this case.
•

URCP Rule 25. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES
(a) Death.
(1) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court may order substitution of the proper parties. The
motion for substitution may be made by any party or by the
successors or representatives of the deceased party and,
together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the
parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons. Unless
the motion for substitution is made not later than ninety days
after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a
statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the
service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the
deceased party.
(2) In the event of the death of one or more of the plaintiffs or
of one or more of the defendants in an action in which the right
sought to be enforced survives only to the surviving plaintiffs or
only against the surviving defendants, the action does not abate.
The death shall be suggested upon the record and the action
shall proceed in favor of or against the surviving parties.
(b) Incompetency. If a party becomes incompetent, the
2

court upon motion served as provided in Subdivision (a) of this
rule may allow the action to be continued by or against his
representative.
(c) Transfer of Interest. In case of any transfer of interest,
the action may be continued by or against the original party,
unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the
interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined
with the original party. Service of the motion shall be made as
provided in Subdivision (a) of this rule.
(d) Public Officers; Death or Separation From Office.
When a public officer is a party to an action and during its
pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office, the
action may be continued and maintained by or against his
successor, if within 6 months after the successor takes office, it
is satisfactorily shown to the court that there is a substantial
need for so continuing and maintaining it. Substitution pursuant
to this rule may be made when it is shown by supplemental
pleading that the successor of an officer adopts or continues or
threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor.
Before a substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected,
unless expressly assenting thereto, shall be given reasonable
notice of the application therefor and accorded an opportunity to
object.
URCP Rule 25.
•

URCP Rule 4 1 . DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule
66(i), and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed
by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an
answer or other response to the complaint permitted under
these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal,
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of
dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed
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by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United
States or of any state an action based on or including the same
claim.
(2) By Order of Court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of
dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action may only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on
order of the court based either on:
(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the
action; or
(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.
If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action
shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless
the counterclaim can remain pending for independent
adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof. For failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order
of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of
any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by
the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his
evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier of the
facts may then determine them and render judgment against the
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits
against the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in
Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable
party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of Counterclaim, Cross-Claim, or Third-Party
Claim. The provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any
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counterclaim, cross- claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to Paragraph (1) of
Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of
evidence at the trial or hearing.
(d) Costs of Previously-Dismissed Action. If a plaintiff who
has once dismissed an action in any court commences an action
based upon or including the same claim against the same
defendant, the court may make such order for the payment of
costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem proper
and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has
complied with the order.
(e) Bond or Undertaking to Be Delivered to Adverse Party.
Should a party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim, pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above,
after a provisional remedy has been allowed such party, the
bond or undertaking filed in support of such provisional remedy
must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained.
URCP Rule 41
•

78-11-12 Survival of action for injury to person or death upon
death of wrongdoer or injured person —Exception and
restriction to out-of-pocket expenses.
(1) (a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or
death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not
abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The
injured person or the personal representatives or heirs of the person
who died have a cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general damages,
subject to Subsection (l)(b).
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies as a
result of a cause other than the injury received as a result of the
wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal
5

representatives or heirs of that person have a cause of action against
the wrongdoer or personal representatives of the wrongdoer only for
special damages occurring prior to death that result from the injury
caused by the wrongdoer, including income loss. "Special damages"
does not include pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other not readily quantifiable damages frequently referred to as
general damages.
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the personal
representatives or heirs of the person who died may recover judgment
except upon competent satisfactory evidence other than the testimony
of that injured person.
Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12 (2001).
•

75-3-104 Claims against decedent —Necessity of
administration.
No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or
his successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment
of a personal representative. After the appointment and until
distribution, all proceedings and actions to enforce a claim against the
estate are governed by the procedure prescribed by this Chapter 3.
After distribution a creditor whose claim has not been barred may
recover from the distributees as provided in Section 75-3-1004 or from
a former personal representative individually liable as provided in
Section 75-3-1005. This section has no application to a proceeding by
a secured creditor of the decedent to enforce his right to his security
except as to any deficiency judgment which might be sought therein.
Editorial Board Comment.—This and sections of Part 8, Chapter 3, are
designed to force creditors of decedents to assert their claims against
duly appointed personal representatives. Creditors of a decedent are
interested persons who may seek the appointment of a personal
representative (§ 75-3-301). If no appointment is granted to another
within 45 days after the decedent's death, a creditor may be eligible to
be appointed if other persons with priority decline to serve or are
ineligible (§ 75-3-203). But, if a personal representative has been
appointed and has closed the estate under circumstances which leave

6

a creditor's claim unbarred, the creditor is permitted to enforce his
claims against distributees, as well as against the personal
representative if any duty owed to creditors under § 75-3-807 or 75-31003 has been breached. The methods for closing estates are outlined
in §§ 75-3-1001 through 75-3-1003. Termination of appointment
under § 75-3-608 et seq. may occur though the estate is not closed
and so may be irrelevant to the question of whether creditors may
pursue distributees.
Utah Code Ann. §75-3-104 (1975).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the Defendant as a
result of an automobile accident. Before the action could be tried, the
Defendant passed away. The Defendant's death was suggested upon the
record by the Defendant's counsel. In addition, Defendant's counsel sent a
letter to the Plaintiff's counsel indicating that at that time no personal
representative had been appointed for the Defendant's estate. The Plaintiff
moved to substitute the Defendant's surviving siblings as the "proper party"
to the action. The Plaintiff failed to provide the Defendant's surviving
siblings with a notice of a hearing on motion to name them as parties to the
action. Accordingly, Defendant's counsel moved to strike the motion to add
the Defendant's brothers and sisters as the "proper party" to this action
under URCP Rule 25. The District Court agreed with the Defendant and
struck the motion to add the Defendant's siblings as the "property party."
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The Plaintiff failed to make a motion that sought to substitute the
Defendant's personal representative as a party to this action within ninety
(90) days of the notice of suggestion of death. Defendant's counsel moved
to dismiss the action for the Plaintiff's failure to comply with URCP Rule 25.
The Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss and the Court granted the
motion. After the Court granted the motion, the Plaintiff appealed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On December 10, 2001, a Notice of Suggestion of Death was

filed by the Defendant's counsel. (R. at 35).
2.

On December 18, 2001, Defendant's counsel informed the

Plaintiff's counsel that no personal representative had been appointed for the
Defendant's estate. (R. at 113).
3.

On March 1, 2002, the Plaintiff filed a motion and supporting

memorandum to substitute the "proper parties" for the deceased Defendant.
(R. at 65-71).
4.

However, rather than seeking to name the personal

representative of the Defendant, the Plaintiff's motion sought to have the
Defendant's surviving siblings (two brothers and three sisters) substituted as
the "proper parties" in this case. (R. at 69-70).

8

5.

The Affidavit of Thomas N. Thompson filed in support of the

motion to substitute states, "It is necessary to substitute the names of the
decedent's heirs for the decedent in this case." (R. at 74).
6.

The Plaintiff then served upon four of the five of the Defendant's

surviving siblings a "Notice of Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Proper Parties
for Deceased Defendant." (As to Sara Flink, R. at 75-76; As to N. De Von
Curtis, R. at 78-79; As to Barbara Inkley, R. at 85-86; As to J. Kent Curtis,
R. at 118-19).
7.

Each notice contained the same statement, "You have been

identified as a sibling of the decedent, Dale H. Curtis, who is a proper party
defendant to the above action." (As to Sara Flink, R. at 76; As to N. De Von
Curtis, R. at 79; As to Barbara Inkley, R. at 86; As to J. Kent Curtis, R. at
119).
8.

In addition, rather than provide the Defendant's surviving

siblings with a notice of a hearing set on the motion so that they could
appear and defend, each notice contained the statement "Should you have
any objection to this motion, you should file the same with the Clerk, Third
Judicial District Court, . . . at any time within fourteen days after service of
the attached documents upon you. In the absence of a timely objection, the
Court may grant the Plaintiff's motion without further notice." (As to Sara
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Flink, R. at 76; As to N. De Von Curtis, R. at 79; As to Barbara Inkley, R. at
86; As to J. Kent Curtis, R. at 119).
9.

However, the Plaintiff did not serve Rula Flink, the Defendant's

sister, with the notice, motion to substitute or supporting memorandum.
(Entire Record).
10.

Neither Sara Flink, N. De Von Curtis, Barbara Inkley, nor J. Kent

Curtis is the Defendant's personal representative. (Entire Record).
11.

On March 5, 2002, Defendant filed a Motion to Strike the

Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Parties with supporting memorandum upon
the grounds that the motion to substitute sought to substitute the wrong
parties and did not contain the required notice of hearing. (R. at 92-99).
12.

Although aware of the deficiencies of his motion to substitute

prior to the expiration of the ninety (90) day period, the Plaintiff refused to
move to substitute the personal representative of the Defendant and
continued forward with his claim that the Defendant's surviving siblings were
the proper parties to this action. (Entire Record).
13.

The District Court found (a) that the Defendant's death was

suggested on the record on December 7, 2001; (b) the Plaintiff was
attempting to substitute the Defendant's heirs as the proper party in this
action; (c) the Defendant's heirs are not the Defendant's personal
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representatives; and (d) the Plaintiff's motion to substitute does not contain a
notice of hearing. (R. at 130)
14.

The Court concluded that the Plaintiff's motion to substitute does

not seek to substitute the Decedent's personal representative for the deceased
party and is improper and must be stricken. (R. at 131)
15.

The Court also concluded that the Plaintiff's motion to substitute

did not contain the required notice of hearing and that defect was also fatal to
the motion. (R. at 131).
16.

The Court entered an Order granting the Motion to Strike

Plaintiff's motion to substitute Decedent's Heirs as a Party on April 29, 2002.
(R. at 129-32)
17.

On April 18, 2002, the Defendant moved with supporting

memorandum to dismiss the action pursuant to URCP Rule 25 for the
Plaintiff's failure to move to substitute the proper party for the deceased
Defendant. (R. at 124-28).
18.

The Plaintiff did not oppose the motion to dismiss. (R. at 136-37

and 138).
19.

On June 12, 2002, the Court entered an order granting the

Defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice. (R. at 150-52).

li

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion by striking
the Plaintiff's motion to substitute that sought to substitute the wrong
parties and failed to contain the required notice of hearing. Upon the death
of the Defendant, the Plaintiff's cause of action could be revived against the
personal representative of the Defendant. The Plaintiff merely had to file a
motion seeking to substitute the Defendant's personal representative or
"John/Jane Doe, the undetermined personal representative of the
Defendant." The Plaintiff refused to do so and sought to have the
Defendant's surviving siblings named as a party to this action. In addition,
the Plaintiff's motion to substitute failed to contain the required notice of
hearing. Accordingly, the District Court, within its permitted range of
discretion, struck the motion to substitute. In the alternative, the District
Court's interpretation that URCP Rule 25 required the Plaintiff to timely move
to substitute the personal representative of the Defendant (whether known
or unknown) with a notice of hearing within ninety (90) days of the notice of
suggestion of death was correct.
Finally, the District Court, within its permitted range of discretion,
dismissed the Plaintiff's action with prejudice because he failed to comply
with the requirements of URCP Rule 25.
12

I.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHIN ITS PERMITTED
RANGE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT STRUCK THE
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE BECAUSE THE
MOTION SOUGHT TO SUBSTITUTE THE WRONG
PARTIES.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it struck the
Plaintiff's motion to substitute for failing to name the proper party. URCP Rule
25 states: w[u]nless the motion for substitution is made not later than ninety
days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of
the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the
action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party." URCP Rule 25. Once
Defendant's death was suggested on the record, the Plaintiff was required to
move to substitute the Defendant's personal representative even if he did not
know who that individual would be. See Stoddard v. Smith. 2001 UT 47, H19,
27 P.3d 546. See also Utah Code Ann. §78-ll-12(l)(a) ("The injured person .
. . ha[s] a cause of action against the . . . personal representative of the
wrongdoer for special and general damages . . .")(emphasis added).
Defendant's counsel even informed the Plaintiff's counsel eleven (11) days
after filing the "Notice of Suggestion of Death" there was no personal
representative of the Defendant, at that time. See December 18, 2001 letter
(R. at 113). Accordingly, all the Plaintiff had to do was file a motion to
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substitute John/Jane Doe, Personal Representative of the Defendant's Estate,
as the Defendant. See Stoddard v. Smith. 2001 UT 47,1119, 27 P.3d 546.
However, the Plaintiff refused to do so. Instead, the Plaintiff attempted to
substitute the Decedent's surviving siblings as the defendants in this action.
See Motion to Substitute Proper Party and Memorandum (R. at 65-71). The
Affidavit of Thomas N. Thompson filed in support of the motion to substitute
states, "It is necessary to substitute the names of the decedent's heirs for
the decedent in this case." See Affidavit of Thomas N. Thompson at 115, (R.
at 74). Such a motion and request is clearly improper. There is no provision
in the Utah Code that allows a Plaintiff to assert a cause of action against a
decedent's heirs for the decedent's alleged negligence. See Utah Code Ann.
§78-11-12. The Plaintiff's cause of action lies against the estate of the
decedent through the personal representative. Id. Yet, the Plaintiff insisted
on naming the Decedent's heirs as defendants and refused to substitute the
personal representative of the estate as the proper party even though he had
knowledge of this deficiency prior to the expiration of the ninety (90) days.
Moreover, the Plaintiff only sought to name four of the five surviving
siblings as defendants in this action. While each sibling qualified potentially as
the personal representative of the estate, none of the siblings where actually
appointed as the personal representative of the estate. In addition, if the

14

Court has failed to strike the Plaintiff's motion to substitute, this case would
have continued against individuals who have no authority or responsibility for
the Defendant's estate. If the Plaintiff obtained a judgment under that
scenario, the judgment would attach to the Defendant's siblings' assets, as
individuals, and not the estate of the Defendant.
Furthermore, another individual, such as the Defendant's un-served
sister, Rula Flink, could have been appointed the Defendant's personal
representative and she would not even be a party to this action. The Plaintiff
argued that the District Court should alter his motion to substitute the
descendant's heirs as a party and make it a motion that appoints the heirs as
the personal representatives of the estate to comply with URCP Rule 25.
"Once all of the heirs are served, the Plaintiff will move to appoint all of those
heirs as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Dale H. Curtis, deceased."
See Opposition to Defendant Motion to Strike Plaintiff's motion to substitute
Parties at page 3, (R. at 102). However, the District Court did not have the
authority to appoint personal representatives of the estate. A proceeding to
appoint a personal representative is independent of the personal injury action.
See Utah Code Ann. §75-3-106 (1975). Therefore, the Court did not exceed
its permitted range of discretion by striking the Plaintiff's motion to substitute
the Defendant's surviving siblings as parties to the action.

15

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHIN ITS PERMITTED
DISCRETION WHEN IT STRUCK THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PROPER PARTIES BECAUSE
IT FAILED TO PROVIDE THE PROPER NOTICE.

The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it struck the
Plaintiff's motion to substitute because it failed to comply with the notice
requirements of URCP Rule 25. The rule specifically requires that the motion
to substitute be served "together with the notice of hearing." URCP Rule
25(a)(1). Even assuming arguendo that the Decedent's heirs are proper
parties, the Plaintiff's failure to serve upon them a "notice of hearing" in the
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a summons is fatal to the motion.
As the Utah Supreme Court states: "the rule requires that the motion,
"together with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as
provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the manner provided by
Rule 4 for the service of summons.'" Stoddard v. Smith. 2001 UT 47, H13, 27
P.3d 546 (emphasis added). The Plaintiff simply failed to meet this
requirement and the District Court was within its permitted range of discretion
by striking the motion to substitute for this failure.
In addition, rather than provide the Defendant's surviving siblings with
a notice of a hearing set on the motion so that they could appear and
defend, each notice contained the statement "Should you have any objection
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to this motion, you should file the same with the Clerk, Third Judicial District
Court, . . . at any time within fourteen days after service of the attached
documents upon you. In the absence of a timely objection, the Court may
grant the Plaintiff's motion without further notice." (As to Sara Flink, R. at
76; As to N. De Von Curtis, R. at 79; As to Barbara Inkley, R. at 86; As to J.
Kent Curtis, R. at 119). The Plaintiff attempted to circumvent the required
hearing by stating that an objection needed to be filed in fourteen days or
the Court would grant the motion without further notice. However, under
URCP Rule 25, a party who is being sought to be substituted as a defendant
is entitled to a hearing. In addition to seeking to substitute the wrong
parties, the Plaintiff's motion denied those parties the right to a hearing.
Accordingly, the District Court was within its permitted range of discretion
when it struck the Plaintiff's motion to substitute Proper Parties because it
failed to provide the substituted parties with a hearing on the motion.

17

III.

I N THE ALTERNATIVE, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS
CORRECT WHEN I T STRUCK THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE BECAUSE THE MOTION
SOUGHT TO SUBSTITUTE THE WRONG PARTIES AND
FAILED TO CONTAIN THE REQUIRED NOTICE OF
HEARING.

In the alternative, if the standard of review of this issue is correctness,
the District Court was correct when it struck the Plaintiff's motion to substitute
the decedent's brothers and sisters as the proper parties in this action and
failed to contain the required notice of hearing. Based upon the foregoing
argument, the District Court was correct when it struck the Plaintiff's motion to
substitute because it failed to bring the required parties before the Court. In
addition, the motion to substitute failed to provide the noticed parties with
their due process right to appear and defend. Accordingly, the District Court
was correct by striking the Plaintiff's motion that failed to substitute the proper
party and failed to include a required notice of hearing.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE BECAUSE UNDER
URCP RULE 41(B) A DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
WAS PRESUMED.

The District Court did not exceed its permitted range of discretion when
it dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice because a dismissal

18

pursuant to URCP Rule 25 is an adjudication on the merits and a dismissal with
prejudice is presumed. In the case of Donahue v. Smith. 2001 UT 46, 27 P.3d
552, the Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to URCP
Rule 25 because the Plaintiff failed to file a motion for substitution within
ninety days after the suggestion of death was filed. The Plaintiff appealed the
District Court's decision and stated that the District Court erred in dismissing
the complaint with prejudice. The Utah Supreme Court reviewed URCP Rule
41 and upheld the District Court's decision to dismiss the action with prejudice.
The Utah Supreme Court stated:
[b]ecause the language in rule 41(b) refers only to a dismissal
under rule 19(b), and because the district court granted the
motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's failure to comply with rule
25, the district court properly determined that the dismissal was
for a failure to 'to comply with these rules.' Therefore, under
rule 41(b), a dismissal with prejudice was presumed, and
the district court was not in error to so rule.
Donahue v. Smith. 2001 UT 46, H8, 27 P.3d 552 (emphasis added). One of
the reasons for this presumption is that the Decedent's estate needs to be
closed in a timely manner. A dismissal without prejudice exposes the estate
and the distributees to additional liabilities for an additional year after the
dismissal. The ninety day requirement of URCP Rule 25 ensures that cases
against the estate of a deceased individual will be brought quickly or not at all.
Accordingly, a dismissal for the Plaintiff's failure to comply with URCP Rule 25
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is presumed to be with prejudice. Therefore, the District Court's action of
dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice did not exceed the permitted
range of discretion and such a dismissal was presumed.
Moreover, the Plaintiff's reliance on the case of Hartford Leasing
Corporation v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) is
misplaced. The Plaintiff argues that the District Court should have applied
the "totality of the circumstances" criteria set forth in Hartford to determine
whether to dismiss the complaint with or without prejudice. However, the
Hartford case dealt with a dismissal for lack of prosecution and not a
dismissal for the failure to timely substitute the proper party. The Utah
Supreme Court has stated that a dismissal with prejudice is presumed when
a party failed to timely substitute a proper party and did not apply the
"totality of the circumstance" criteria. See Donahue v. Smith, 2001 UT 46,
118, 27 P.3d 552. Accordingly, the District Court acted as it was presumed to
do and did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice.
Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that the Court should not have dismissed the
complaint with prejudice because he "did everything possible to bring the
proper parties before the Court" and "[t]he Defendant. . . made no effort to
advise the plaintiff of who should properly be appointed as personal
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representative . . ." See Appellant's Brief at page 17. However, these
allegations are without merit. The Defendant's counsel informed the Plaintiff
eleven (11) days after filing the "Notice of Suggestion of Death" there was no
personal representative of the Defendant. Upon receiving this information, all
the Plaintiff had to do was file a motion to substitute John/Jane Doe, Personal
Representative of the Defendant's Estate. The Plaintiff even could have, at
any time after the notice of suggestion of death, petitioned the Court in a
separate action to appoint himself or another individual as personal
representative of the Defendant's estate and then substitute that person as
the Defendant in the action. See Utah Code Ann. §75-3-203 (1983).
However, the Plaintiff refused to do so and insisted on attempting to substitute
the Decedent's surviving siblings as the defendants in this action. The
Defendant is not required to move the Plaintiff's case on to judgment. See
Hartford. 888 P.2d at 698. It was the Plaintiff's obligation to move to
substitute the proper party and include the required notice of hearing. The
Plaintiff failed to do so in the time allowed. Therefore, the District Court did
not exceed its permitted range of discretion by dismissing the case with
prejudice.
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CONCLUSION
The District Court did not abuse its discretion or was correct in striking a
motion to substitute that did not seek to substitute the proper party and failed
to contain the required notice. In addition, a dismissal under URCP Rule 25 for
the failure to substitute a proper party is an adjudication on the merits and
presumed to be dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, the District Court did
not abuse its discretion by dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the District Court's Order on Motion to
Strike Plaintiff's motion to substitute Decedent's Heirs as a Party and the
Order on URCP Rule 25 Motion Dismiss must be upheld.
DATED this B #

day of January 2003.
PLANT, WALJ-ACE7aTRISTENSEN & KAN ELL

M-^
TerYy M. Plant
Cory D. Memmott
Attorneys for Defendant Curtis
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two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing document, to be hand
delivered to:
James C. Haskins
Thomas N. Thompson
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2827
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